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Abstract 
We exploit the 2007-2009 financial crisis to analyze how risk relates to bank business 
models. Institutions with higher risk exposure had less capital, larger size, greater reliance 
on short-term market funding, and aggressive credit growth. Business models related to 
significantly reduced bank risk were characterized by a strong deposit base and greater 
income diversification. The effect of business models is non-linear: it has a different impact 
on riskier banks. Finally, it is difficult to establish in real time whether greater stock market 
capitalization involves real value creation or the accumulation of latent risk. 
 
JEL classification: G21; G15; E58; G32 





Working Paper Series No 1394
November 2011
Non-technical summary 
One of the main reasons for the existence of banks is that they are better than other institutions 
at evaluating and managing risks. The recent crisis gave way, however, to the largest 
materialization of bank risk since the great depression. Precisely the special role of banks as 
evaluators of risk makes the banking sector a particularly opaque industry. This opacity has 
probably increased in recent years due to structural changes in the banking industry brought 
about by de-regulation and financial innovation. These changes made the banking industry 
significantly more complex, larger, global and dependent on financial markets’ developments. 
We exploit the advent of the crisis to analyze whether the variability across banks business 
models can be related to the materialization of bank risk during the period of the crisis. 
For a large sample of listed banks operating in the European Union and the United 
States, we compute different measures of realized bank risk – namely the likelihood of a bank 
rescue, systematic risk and the intensity of recourse to central bank liquidity. We then consider 
how these variables are related to a range of pre-crisis individual bank information obtained 
from a manually-assembled database.  
We find that credit expansion, lower dependence on customer deposits, size and weaker 
capital (especially for undercapitalized banks) in the run up to the crisis accounted for higher 
ex-post levels of distress. Other factors, including the amount of market funding and lack of 
diversification in income sources also contributed to an increase in realized bank risk. 
Accounting for macroeconomic and institutional factors – including the role of deregulation, 
economic cycle, competition and asset prices developments – do not change the gist of our 
results. In line with Rajan (2005) and Acharya, Pagano and Volpin (2011), our results also 
suggest that it is difficult to disentangle ex-ante among the different reasons for the creation of 
stock market value: we find that for some banks the large increases in stock market values 
prior to the crisis took place on the back of the creation of latent systematic risks whereas for 
others institutions it reflected relative managerial ability. 
  A second contribution of this paper is to show, using regression quantile techniques, 
that the impact of business models is highly non-linear. The level of distress of the riskier 
banks is more sensitive to loan growth, customer deposits and market funding. More precisely, 
a stronger customer deposit base is relatively more effective in reducing distress for the riskier 6
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compared to the less risky banks. Similarly, a higher proportion of market funding increases 
the likelihood of distress of the riskiest banks although it has no effect on the less risky 
institutions. 
  In relation to prudential regulatory initiatives undergoing at the global level via Basle 
III, our results are in line with Basle initiatives aimed at raising the core capital levels of 
institutions and in particular of undercapitalized ones. They also concur with efforts directed at 
reducing the cyclicality of credit and increases in the capital charges of those institutions 
relying more strongly on short-term market funding. Given its quantitative importance, a 
careful assessment of the implementation of the anti-cyclical capital buffers proposed by Basle 
III is warranted. For instance our results show that excessive loan growth seems to be a very 
good leading indicator of bank risk so that capital charges linked to this variable might be 
considered.  7
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   In cauda venenum 
1 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis resulted in the largest realization of bank risk since the 
Great Depression. The decimation of the market value of banking shares during this period 
was unprecedented: more than 3 trillion euros were erased from the market capitalisation of 
banks in Europe and the United States. This corresponds to a decrease of 82% in the stock 
market value of these banks between May 2007 and March 2009. The impact on the real 
economy triggered by the problems in the banking sector was extremely severe, producing 
record levels of unemployment and giving way to what is now referred to as the “Great 
Recession”. However, while the loss in value was widespread, the effects of the crisis were 
very diverse across banks. A case in point is provided by the increased dispersion of cross-
sectional stock market returns after the crisis, suggesting a strong degree of heterogeneity 
in ex-ante risk-taking (see Figure 1). This paper has three main objectives in this regard. 
First, we analyse the impact of different business models on bank distress. Second, we 
examine whether this impact is non-linear at the cross-sectional level. Third, we assess 
whether the high stock market values experienced by a number of banks prior to the crisis 
were actually related to an accumulation of latent risk. 
{Figure 1} 
  For a large sample of listed banks operating in the European Union and the United 
States, we measure the risk that materialised during the crisis in three ways: the likelihood 
of a bank rescue, systematic risk, and the recourse to central bank liquidity. This 
multifaceted approach lends robustness to our results, as it captures the different 
dimensions of risk as they unfold during a crisis. We then consider how these variables are 
related to the characteristics of individual banks during the pre-crisis period using a 
database laboriously compiled for the purposes of this study. We group individual bank 
information into four categories – capital, asset, funding, and income structures – which 
concisely and effectively summarize the underlying bank business models. We therefore 
use the crisis as a laboratory in which risks that were not apparent on bank risk indicators 
                                                 
 
1 “In the tail (is) the poison” or “To save the worst for last”. Roman aphorism.  8
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prior to the crisis are manifested and link the dispersion of the ex-post manifestation of 
risks to the ex-ante (i.e. before risk materialized) variability in bank business models.
2 
  We find that credit expansion, a lower dependence on customer deposits, bank size, 
and a weaker capital base (especially for undercapitalised banks) in the run-up to the crisis 
accounted for higher levels of ex-post risk. Other contributing factors include the amount 
of market funding used and the lack of diversification in income sources. These results are 
robust with regard to the use of different indicators measuring diverse aspects of bank risk. 
Taking into consideration macroeconomic and institutional factors – including the role of 
deregulation, the economic cycle, competition, and developments in asset prices – does not 
significantly alter the main results. 
  Second, we show that ex-post measures of managerial abilities considerably 
augment the explanatory power of the regressions, suggesting that bank business models 
still leave a significant portion of risk unaccounted for. In this respect, and in line with 
Rajan (2005), our results suggest that for some banks the large market-to-book values 
attained prior to the crisis occurred on the back of latent systematic risk, whereas for others 
it reflected better managerial ability. The results also show that it is difficult to disentangle 
ex-ante the different factors behind the creation of stock market value (Rajan, 2005; 
Acharya et al., 2011).  
  Finally, our results also indicate that the effect of business models on bank risk is 
highly non-linear. This impact was identified by estimating a quantile regression version of 
the baseline specification. This estimation reveals whether the risk determinants of the 
riskiest banks (those belonging to the higher quantiles of the cross-sectional distribution of 
risk during the crisis) are identical to those of the less risky banks (those belonging to the 
lower quantiles of the distribution). In fact, the “riskier” banks were found to be more 
sensitive to loan growth, customer deposits and market funding, in terms of their levels of 
distress. More precisely, a stronger customer deposit base is relatively more effective in 
reducing distress for these banks than for the less risky ones. Finally, a higher proportion of 
                                                 
2 See Beltratti and Stulz (2011); Bekaert et al. (2011); Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2011) for similar applications analysing stock market 
performances. 9
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market funding increases the probability of distress for the riskiest banks, but has no effect 
on the less risky institutions.   
  Our findings have a bearing on the current prudential regulatory debate. From a 
long-term perspective the run-up to the 2007-2009 crisis was characterised by a process of 
financial deregulation and rapid innovation, with the widespread use of new financial 
instruments. Both of these factors altered the business models as well as the incentives for 
banks to take on new risks. The regulatory answer to these incentives, via the initial Basel I 
Accord, mostly focused on efforts aimed at applying common minimum capital 
requirements related to banks’ credit risk exposures.
3 The Basel II Accord, however, did 
not require a minimum common standard for capital charges, but rather allowed large and 
sophisticated institutions to use their own internal risk assessment models. With the benefit 
of hindsight, the results presented here suggest that the lower reliance on rules, as well as a 
stronger dependence on market discipline and self-regulation recommended by the Basel II 
Accord, contributed to the build-up of risk by many institutions in the period before the 
crisis.  
  Our results support the Basel III initiatives aimed at raising the core capital levels of 
institutions, in particular of undercapitalized ones (See BIS, 2010). They concur with 
efforts directed at reducing the cyclicality of credit and increases in the capital charges for 
those institutions relying more strongly on short-term market funding. Our findings also 
clearly indicate that excessive loan growth leads to the accumulation of risk by banks so the 
introduction of capital charges linked to this variable could be considered. In this respect, 
and given its quantitative importance, a careful assessment of the implementation of the 
anti-cyclical capital buffers proposed by Basel III is recomended.  
  This paper also suggests that regulators should increase their involvement in and 
understanding of bank business models and incentives to take on risk, issues which have 
not been explicitly incorporated in Basel III. In particular, regulators need to consider risk-
taking incentives in real time and focus on the potential impact of different business models 
on risk. Our findings provide valid reasons for the closer scrutiny of banks experiencing 
                                                 
3 The initial Basel I Accord was triggered by a widespread discontent on the part of regulators with the capital ratios of many banking 
institutions, particularly the larger ones, after the 1982 Mexican debt moratorium and the following banking crisis. 10
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rapid increases in their stock market valuations, to ascertain whether it is driven by 
improved managerial abilities or by increasing the bank’s exposure to hidden risks. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an overview 
of the transformation of the financial system over the past three decades and the impact that 
this has had on bank business models and risk-taking incentives. Section II reviews the 
literature on business models and bank risk, while Section III describes the model, data 
sources, and how the dataset was constructed. Section IV presents the main empirical 
findings, together with robustness tests and further refinements based on quantile 
regression techniques. Section V presents conclusions and makes recommendations for 
future regulation and research. 
I.  The transformation of the financial system and its impact on business models and 
bank risk 
The evaluation, management and sharing of risk is one of the core features of the banking 
sector. In fact, a key reason for the existence of banks is that they are better at screening 
and managing risks than other institutions, so they can act as delegated monitors for 
uninformed depositors (Diamond, 1984). Compared with financial markets, banks are also 
better at handling those risks which cannot be diversified away (Allen and Gale, 1997). 
Despite this ability, the huge accumulation of risk that subsequently materialized during the 
recent crisis raises significant doubts as to whether banks face the right incentives to 
manage risk effectively on behalf of depositors and investors. Indeed structural 
developments in the banking industry have probably helped distort incentives towards more 
risk-taking and a closer dependence on financial markets (Rajan, 2005; Boot and Thakor, 
2010). 
  The first major structural development was deregulation. Over the past 25 years, 
there has been a strong process of liberalization of the banking sector in most developed 
countries – a development that has also altered incentives to take on risk. In the wake of the 
globalization of financial markets, deregulation aimed to achieve economic gains on the 
back of greater competition. The result was an unparalleled loosening of the regulatory 
constraints on banks; a development that has increased competition and lowered their 11
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charter values (Hellman et al., 2000).
4 In the United States this liberalization de facto 
dismantled barriers to the geographical expansion of banks and included a far-reaching 
deregulation of investment bank activities, prompting the creation of large financial 
institutions involved in a broad range of banking activitiesbusinesses.
5 There was a parallel 
experience with deregulation in the European Union which (supported by the creation of 
the Single Market in 1992 and the introduction of the euro in 1999) removed some residual 
regulations limiting certain bank activities.  
  The second major structural development was financial innovation. Large increases 
in the use of direct funding available via the financial markets and securitization activity 
formed part of a wider trend of innovation that intensified the trading of credit risk between 
banks and financial markets. An important implication of this was that banks became more 
integrated with financial markets and increased their share of non-interest income as a 
proportion of total revenues derived from own-trading, brokerage and investment banking 
activities (Boot and Thakor, 2010).  
  Deregulation and financial innovation led to a profound change of bank business 
models while altering their incentives to take on risks. These changes impacted on several 
dimensions, such as: size, recourse to non-interest income revenues, corporate governance, 
and funding practices, which, in turn, were all affected by the macroeconomic and 
competitive environments. 
  At the global level, the regulatory response to these enhanced incentives to acquire 
new risks concentrated on the Basel recommendations, which focused on capital 
requirements as the cornerstone of prudential regulations for banks.
6 Whereas the initial 
1988 Basel I Accord set a standardized minimum level of bank capital for all banks, the 
Basel II Accord aimed at more closely connecting capital requirements with underlying 
banks’ risks. It also lowered the degree of regulators and supervisors involvement in the 
                                                 
4 Deregulation mainly involved the loosening of regulations related to structure and conduct. Structure regulations are primarily 
concerned with whether institutions can undertake certain activities (such as those involving the functional separation of institutions, 
entry restrictions or discriminatory rules against foreign banks), whereas conduct regulations focus on normative rules specifying 
appropriate firm behaviour and business practices, mainly in respect of bank interaction with customers (some typical examples being the 
regulations on fees and commissions, deposit and lending rates or branching limitations). 
5 One notorious example is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 in the United States, which repealed the Banking Act of 1933 (the 
Glass-Steagall Act) that had previously imposed a separation or “firewall” between commercial and securities-related banking activities. 
6 In other words, the general trend was to introduce competition in banking and to contain risk-taking incentives via capital requirements 
(Vives, 2000).  12
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conduct of banks’ activities by favoring best practices from financial markets. For instance 
Basle II allowed a stronger reliance of capital requirements on banks’ internal risk 
assessment models and encouraged a greater role for financial markets as a supervisory 
disciplining device. A potential side-effect of the Basel II Accord might have been to 
compound the problems of cyclicality of the financial system, which were already 
exacerbated by ongoing changes in the financial system (Kashyap and Stein, 2004).  
  Despite the significant build-up of risks arising from these factors, the majority of 
the most commonly used indicators of bank risk showed a fairly benign picture in the years 
preceding the crisis. Indeed, even the forward-looking measures of bank risk regularly used 
by financial institutions, investors, central banks, and regulators to monitor the health of the 
financial system remained at very low levels (IMF, 2009; ECB, 2009). In parallel, existing 
evidence indicates that there was a convergence or “flattening” in the differences in 
performance between banks before the crisis broke (as measured, for instance, by stock 
market returns: see Figure 1 above). The crisis, however, revealed huge variability across 
individual banks, as evidence by the cross-sectional dispersion of risk indicators, which 
widened significantly during this period. This raises the question of whether the variability 
in specific bank characteristics, due to their different business models, could have helped in 
the early identification of hidden risks, which would only materialize in the long-term or in 
the event of a substantial shock. 
II.  Bank risk and business models: a literature review 
A number of studies have focused on the relationship between certain business model 
characteristics and bank risk. Already, prior to the crisis, research has focused on the 
interaction between risk and a number of key factors: capital (see, for instance, Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2000), operating efficiency (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997), funding sources 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010), securitization and links with financial markets (Boot 
and Thakor, 2010; Keys et al., 2008; Mian and Sufi, 2009), corporate governance (Laeven 
and Levine, 2009) and diversification (Stiroh, 2010).
7 
                                                 
7 A parallel body of literature has analyzed the impact of bank competition on bank risk (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). 13
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  During the recent crisis a number of recent studies have focused on the determinants 
of performance using stock market information relating to large banks. Beltratti and Stulz 
(2011), for example, found that banks with more Tier I capital (in countries with stronger 
capital supervision) and a higher loan to total assets ratio performed better in the initial 
stages of the crisis, while banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse.
8 
A larger deposit base and more liquid assets were associated with higher returns 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2010). Moreover, banks with stronger internal risk controls also 
fared better, while the impact of corporate governance was mixed (Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2010; Peni and Vähämaa, 2011).  
  The focus of our study is exclusively on bank risk. As the realisation of risk is a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon, we consider a number of different risk indicators 
to gauge the level of distress that banks experienced. Namely, we analyse: the probability 
of a bank rescue, systematic risk, and recourse to central bank liquidity facilities (which 
allows for assessing the consistency of our results across risk indicators). The  rest  of  this 
section offers a selective overview of the existing literature linking specific aspects of bank 
business models with risk. We structure the review by grouping business models into four 
main broad categories, used later in our empirical investigation. 
II.A  Capital structure  
As previously highlighted, the period of banking deregulation was partly counterbalanced 
by regulators giving bank capital a more prominent role in the prudential regulatory 
process, as reflected in the initial Basel Accord on capital standards, and subsequent 
amendments. Depending on the particular focus and modelling strategy involved, the 
literature offers contradictory results as to the effects of capital requirements on bank risk 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008). In principle, the higher the capital reserves, the stronger the 
buffer to withstand losses. Less leverage (more capital) also reduces risk-shifting incentives 
from shareholders towards excessively risky projects at the expense of debt holders. This is 
specially so in the banking industry where a quasi-flat (i.e. not fully risk-adjusted) deposit 
insurance exists creating an incentive for shareholders to optimize the option value of the 
                                                 
8 Idiosyncratic bank performance also seems persistent when comparing this to the previous banking crisis (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and 
Stulz, 2011). 14
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deposit insurance by taking on excessive risks (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). Recent 
studies on bank capital also analyze the possibility of asset-shifting in favor of riskier 
assets, where moral hazard considerations play a role. These generally find that a higher 
level of capital is also conducive to a more intensive screening of borrowers and, therefore, 
less bank risk (Coval and Thakor, 2005; Mehran and Thakor, 2011).   
  Nonetheless, a positive relationship between capital and risk can also exist. More 
specifically, agency problems between shareholders and managers can lead to excessive 
risk-taking via managerial rent-seeking. According to the corporate finance literature, 
increasing leverage reduces agency conflicts between managers and shareholders since 
informed debt holders intensify the pressure on bank managers to become more efficient 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). A 
positive relationship between bank capital and risk can also occur if regulators (or the 
markets) force riskier banks to build up capital, or simply if banks with more capital have a 
greater risk absorption capacity and, as a result, take on more risk (Berger and Bouwman, 
2010). Finally, it is also possible that there is a non-linear relationship and that both very 
low and very high levels of capital induce banks to take on more risk (Calem and Rob, 
1999).
9 Overall, the empirical literature tends to support the view that more capital 
increases bank soundness particularly during periods of crisis and for higher quality (i.e. 
core) forms of capital (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2010; Berger, and Bouwman, 2010). 
II.B  Asset structure 
Size can be an important determinant of banks’ risk (Huang et al., 2011; Drehmann and 
Tarashev, 2011; Tarashev et al., 2009). Compared to smaller banks, larger institutions 
could have different incentives due to the “too-big-to-fail” problem or diversification 
possibilities (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).  
  Another major factor is securitisation, which enables banks to off-load part of their 
loans from the asset side of their balance sheet to financial market investors. The years 
                                                 
9 Acharya, Mehran and Thakor (2010) show that banks face two moral hazard problems – asset substitution by shareholders and 
managerial rent-seeking – which require a level of bank leverage that is neither too low nor too high. According to their model, the 
optimal capital regulation requires that a part of bank capital be unavailable to creditors upon failure, and be available to shareholders 
only contingent on good performance. 15
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preceding the crisis also coincided with a rapid growth in off-balance sheet financing by 
banks that was supported by the massive expansion of securitisation markets. This changed 
banks’ business models dramatically altering their incentives to hedge and take on new 
risks (Shin, 2009; Marques-Ibanez and Scheicher, 2010). Structurally, securitization 
allowed banks to turn traditionally illiquid claims (overwhelmingly in the form of bank 
loans) into marketable securities. The development of securitization therefore allowed 
banks to off-load part of their credit exposure, thereby lowering regulatory pressures on 
capital requirements and raising new funds. In principle, from the perspective of individual 
banks, securitization allowed banks to manage and diversify their credit risk portfolio more 
easily, both geographically and by sector. Scant empirical evidence from the pre-crisis 
period also went in this direction. In particular, banks that were more active in the 
securitization market were often found to have lower solvency risk, higher profitability 
levels, and were better capitalized (see, among others, Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004, and 
Wu et al., 2011). However, banks might also respond to the static reduction in risks due to 
securitization by taking on new ones; for instance, by loosening their lending standards, 
increasing their leverage, or becoming systemically riskier (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Keys et 
al., 2010; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011).  
II.C  Funding structure 
The deregulation and financial innovation developments led banks to increase their 
dependence on financial markets for their funding. This involved borrowing more 
intensively from wholesale markets, where funds are usually raised on a rollover basis 
through instruments such as mortgage bonds, repurchase agreements and commercial 
paper.  
  An alternative source of funding is represented by retail deposits, which tend to be 
more stable in periods of crisis (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010): since they are typically insured 
by the government, their withdrawals in most circumstances are usually predictable at the 
aggregate level and mostly linked to depositors’ liquidity needs (Song and Thakor, 2007; 
Huang and Ratnovski, 2011). The “stickiness” of deposits is also related to high switching 
costs and the transaction services that retail depositors receive from banks (Kim et al., 16
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2003). Deposits, however, are often less flexible in adapting to changes in financing needs, 
to fund investment opportunities, compared with wholesale markets.  
  In terms of the impact of the funding structure on bank risk, most of the earlier 
literature pointed to the benefits derived from the use of market financing. Banks can raise 
in the interbank markets large new amounts of funding swiftly and at relatively low cost. It 
was also argued that, compared to depositors, financial market investors tend to be 
relatively sophisticated, and hence they were expected to provide more market discipline 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991).
10 The recent financial crisis, however, pointed to a “dark 
side” of wholesale funding. For instance, Huang and Ratnovski (2008) show that, on the 
basis of cheap and noisy signals, wholesale financiers have lower incentives to conduct 
costly monitoring. This can trigger the liquidation of solvent institutions due to sudden 
withdrawals based on negative public signals. Indeed, the recent crisis has starkly 
illustrated that market sources of funding are heavily dependent on market perceptions, 
raising doubts concerning the monitoring role of wholesale investors. Recent evidence 
suggests that when funding from financial markets became unavailable, or prohibitively 
expensive, the market valued more positively those institutions more heavily funded via 
customers’ deposits (Beltratti and Stultz, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2010).    
II.D  Income structure 
Another consequence of deregulation has been a geographical expansion of a number of 
financial institutions, a phenomenon which usually coincides with high rates of credit 
growth. Strong credit growth was also fuelled by raised collateral values, due to sharp 
increases in housing prices in some countries and the more easily available access to 
wholesale funding, linked to financial innovation.  
  Historically, most systemic banking crises have been preceded by periods of 
excessive lending growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). While macroeconomic and 
structural changes, such as increases in banking competition, could affect aggregate 
changes in lending, added to these factors, microeconomic dynamics could also play a role. 
For instance, individual banks could intend to seize new lending opportunities, expand to 
                                                 
10 The empirical evidence relating to the market discipline of banks (from debt holders in financial markets) is mixed (see Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996, and Krishnan et al., 2005).  17
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new geographic markets, or gain market share, loosening credit standards in the process 
(e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ruckes, 2004). Microeconomic evidence from large 
international banks suggests that loan growth represents an important driver of risk (Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2003; Foos et al., 2010; Keeton, 1999). 
  The global trend towards more diversification in bank income sources and an 
expansion of non-interest income revenues (i.e. those revenues derived from trading, 
investment banking, brokerage fees and commissions) has provided banks with additional 
sources of revenue (Stiroh, 2010). Such diversification can, in principle, help foster 
stability in overall income. At the same time, it is not clear whether the stronger reliance on 
non-interest income reduces overall banking risk. Since this type of income tends to be a 
more volatile source of revenue than interest rate income, in periods of financial stress 
there could be a decline in the traditional sources of revenue, together with an even larger 
decline in revenues from fees and brokerage services. It is then possible that the financial 
stability benefits that may be obtained from diversification accrue only in cases of minor 
idiosyncratic risk, but not in the context of a wider systemic shock.   
  The empirical evidence for the impact of diversification on bank risk in the U.S. and 
around the world is mixed (Stiroh, 2010). A general conclusion from these studies is that 
the growing reliance on non-interest income has not been associated with reduced volatility 
in earnings (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004), or a decline in bank systematic 
risk, as derived from stock market returns (Baele et al., 2007; De Jonghe, 2010).  
II.E  Additional control variables 
While our focus is on bank business models, in the empirical specifications we do control 
for a number of variables that account for major macroeconomic and institutional factors, 
such as developments in housing and equity markets, competition, and corporate 
governance.  
  The role of macroeconomic variables in relation to bank risk works via lenders’ 
economic expectations and borrowers’ net worth: increases in borrowers’ collateral values 
cause an overall improvement in the perceived creditworthiness of both borrowers and 18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1394
November 2011
banks. In this situation, there is a greater incentive for banks to ease financial constraints 
and increase lending, thereby taking on more risks (Matsuyama, 2007). 
  The impact of competition on bank risk is ambiguous. Enhanced competition could 
lead to greater (and possibly excessive) risk-taking by banks (Jimenez and Lopez, 2007). 
This is because increased competition reduces market power which, coupled with limited 
liability and the application of flat rate deposit insurance, could in turn encourage banks to 
take on more risk (Hellman et al., 2000). In contrast, Boyd and De Niccoló (2005) argue 
that the theoretical basis for linking increased competition with greater risk-taking is 
fragile. Other recent empirical work is consistent with this view (Boyd et al., 2006; Cihak 
et al., 2006). The intensity of bank supervision could also have had an impact on the 
amount of risk undertaken (Beltratti and Stulz, 2011). In particular, it is necessary to verify 
whether more permissive legislation regarding bank activities could have led financial 
intermediaries to take more risks (Barth et al., 2004).  
  Conflicts between bank managers and owners might also have an impact on bank 
risk-taking. In principle, companies with a diversified shareholder ownership advocate 
more risk-taking, as each shareholder tends to have a substantial equity stake in the bank 
concerned (Laeven and Levine, 2009).  Firms with a higher degree of institutional 
ownership also appear to have undertaken more risk prior to the crisis, prompting large 
losses for their shareholders during the crisis (Erkens et al., 2009).  
III.  Model and data 
In line with the previous discussion, our empirical investigation is based on the following 
specification: 
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  The dependent variable (ri,c) measures the distress of bank i during the crisis period 
c (2007Q4 to 2009Q4),
11 while the regressors include the averages for bank characteristics 
and for controls in the pre-crisis period b (2003Q4 to 2007Q3). The use of average 
information for the pre-crisis period serves to minimize short-term distortions in bank 
characteristics, since our main objective is to show whether certain medium or long-term 
business characteristics present in the pre-crisis period can be systematically linked to the 
risks that materialised during the financial crisis. By combining information from the pre-
crisis period and the manifestation of risk during the crisis, we are able to minimize 
endogeneity problems by using the crisis as a laboratory (see Beltratti and Stulz, 2011; 
Bekaert et al., 2011; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2011).   
   The statistical sources used and a brief description of the main variables included in 
our study are provided in Table I, while Table II shows the main descriptive statistics. Our 
initial dataset had more than 1,100 listed banks from 16 countries; namely: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and United States. The final 
dataset comprises only listed banks (which typically adhere to international accounting 
standards) for which all the necessary information was available. From a macroeconomic 
point of view, it is highly representative, as it covers around two-thirds of the total 
aggregate balance sheet of banks operating in the European Union and United States. The 
rest of this section describes in detail the construction of each variable. 
  
     { T a b l e s   I   a n d   I I }   
   
III.A  Construction of bank risk variables 
The purpose of our analysis is to identify the main determinants behind the accumulation of 
bank risk and its subsequent realization during the recent financial crisis. During a crisis, 
                                                 
11 Hence, our sample horizon excludes the period of tension in sovereign bond markets. This is because the spillover effects on the 
banking sector would distort our model and, thus, our final results. For instance, between 2009 and 2010, the yield for 10-year Greek 
government bonds increased from 5.2% to 9.3%, raising the spread with the government bonds of euro area counterparts from 110 basis 
points to 530 basis points. This also affected all the indicators of bank risk for Greek banks. 20
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however, the appearance of bank risk unfolds progressively and manifests itself in different 
dimensions. To ensure that our results do not depend on a specific definition of bank risk, 
we employ three alternative measures to capture the different aspects of its realization. 
i. Financial support (resc) – Our first measure of bank risk captures whether an institution 
received any government support. The construction of this variable is based on the 
collection of information relating to the public rescue of banks via capital injections, the 
issuance of state-guaranteed bonds, or other government-sponsored programmes. We use 
several sources, including the European Commission, central banks, the Bank for 
International Settlements, Bloomberg, and the websites of a number of government 
institutions.
12 The resulting dependent dummy variable takes the value of one if public 
financial support was received during the crisis and zero if otherwise.  
ii. Systematic risk (risk) – Our second measure of bank risk is based on the concept of a 
bank market exposure during the financial crisis. It is constructed using a simple capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), based on the following equation:  
Ri,k,t= βi,k,t * Rm,k,t + εi,k,                                                                                                                                                                                    (2) 
where Ri,k,t is the daily logarithmic excess stock market returns for each bank i from country 
k at time t;
13 Rm,k,t is the daily logarithmic excess stock market returns from the broad stock 
market index m for country k; and the term εi,k,t is a bank-specific residual. To ensure 
comparability, we use the broad stock market index for each country available from 
Datastream. For each bank i, we calculate the systematic component βi,k,t by running 
separate regressions on daily data for every quarter q from 2007Q4 to 2009Q4. We then 
calculate the average beta for each individual bank during the crisis period. Because it has 
been constructed with data from an extreme event as the recent financial crisis, this 
measure captures the dependence of banks on the market in tail periods. Hence, in a cross-
sectional analysis, we are able to detect which banks are relatively more exposed to tail 
risks.
14   
                                                 
12 For a comprehensive overview of the public measures in support of the financial sector see Stolz and Wedow (2010). 
13 We calculate excess returns as the difference between stock market returns and the 10-year government bond yield for the country 
concerned.  
14 Acharya et al. (2011), Brownlees and Engle (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) propose more sophisticated although 
conceptually similar alternative measures of systemic risk based on stock market information. 21
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iii. Central bank liquidity demand (bid) – Our third measure of bank risk is based on 
information on liquidity provided to banks by the Eurosystem (i.e European System of 
Central Banks, see ECB, 2011). It is constructed as the overall liquidity position of each 
institution with the Eurosystem and encompasses two main types of liquidity provision: 
weekly main refinancing operations and longer-term refinancing operations, with a 
maturity ranging from one month to one year. This overall liquidity exposure is divided by 
total assets in order to make the amounts comparable across institutions.
15 Unlike the two 
previous measures, this variable also accounts for liquidity risk, covering another aspect of 
bank risk that is, in principle, transitory in nature, but which might signal future banking 
problems.  
III.B  Bank business models  
We match information on average bank risk during the period of the crisis with data for 
bank characteristics from the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3). We start with the 
approximation of business models using a dataset of consolidated quarterly financial 
statements obtained from Bloomberg. We then select and group the regressors according to 
different bank business models, following the insights gleaned from the literature on bank 
risk discussed previously (in Section II). Our aim is to discover whether certain business 
models operating in the pre-crisis period could be linked to the emergence of greater risk 
during the crisis. Consequently we separate our regressors into four main groups, 
accounting for: the bank capital structure (i), asset structure (ii), funding structure (iii), and 
income structure (iv).  
i. Capital structure – We approximate bank capital by using a ratio of Tier I capital to 
total assets (eta). We aim to capture high-quality (i.e. core) equity, such as Tier I capital, 
which is expected to be more effective in safeguarding a bank’s financial viability 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2011). As already discussed, the impact of capital on the bank’s risk 
is ambiguous. It might be negatively related to the probability of distress if it serves as an 
ex-ante buffer against potential losses. It could also be positively related to bank distress if 
                                                 
15 We restrict our results to the period of full allotment of liquidity provision by the European Central Bank (starting in October 2008) to 
avoid any distortions arising from changes in the central bank operational framework. We include only information on listed banking 
groups for which consolidated financial statements are available via Bloomberg. This limits the size of our sample to just 83 banking 
groups but these cover, nonetheless, more than 90% of the average liquidity provided by the Eurosystem.
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it is driven by regulatory or market actions imposing stricter requirements on riskier banks. 
In line with Calem and Rob (1998), Perotti et al. (2011) and the proposals made by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), our measure of capital interacts with a 
dummy indicator (eta_reg) for banks with low capital ratios (below 6%) to account for the 
possible non-linear effect that bank capital may have on bank risk  
ii. Asset structure – The first variable characterizing the asset structure is size (size), 
measured as the average logarithm of total assets of the consolidated institution before the 
crisis. It allows us to capture the effects of diversification and other economies of scope 
(such as access to markets) related to reduced levels of risk for larger banks. Alternatively, 
larger banks may be more prone to concerns about being “too big to fail”, or be too 
complex to manage. They may also suffer more severely from the effects of greater 
inefficiencies in their internal capital markets and thus become riskier (Stein, 1997).  
  A second variable capturing a different aspect of the asset structure is the ratio of 
loans to total assets (loan_ta). This provides a summary indication of the extent to which a 
bank is involved in traditional lending activities.  
  The amount of securitization activity (abs) represents another important aspect of 
how banks manage their asset structure. However, the impact of securitization on bank risk 
is uncertain. Securitization may fulfil a funding function and allow banks to remove credit 
risk from their balance sheets and pass it on to investors. Alternatively, it might lead banks 
to take on additional risk with the new funds generated or to simply lower their overall 
credit standards. Dealogic, an independent data provider, is the source of information on 
securitization activity. This data has been matched with balance sheet information made 
public by individual banks and then used to calculate the private securitization originated 
per quarter by each individual bank as a proportion of total bank assets during the same 
period.
16  
iii. Funding structure – The third group of regressors is concerned with the structure of 
on-balance sheet funding. It accounts for reliance on short-term wholesale funding, 
                                                 
16 We look at individual deal-by-deal issuance patterns in the private securitization market. The advantage of using data on securitization 
activity from Dealogic is that the name of the originator, date of issuance and deal proceeds are registered. The sample includes public 
offerings of funded asset-backed securities (ABSs) as well as issues of cash flow (balance-sheet) collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
In other words, the securities included in the sample involve a transfer of funding from market investors to originators so that pure 
synthetic structures (such as synthetic CDOs which transfer credit risk only) and public securitization are not included.  23
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measured as the ratio of short-term marketable securities to total assets (mkt_assets), which 
might make banks more exposed to funding liquidity shocks. We also include the ratio of 
retail customer deposits to total assets (dep), as this represents an important component of 
the liabilities of traditional commercial banks. In light of the ubiquitous government 
deposit guarantees in place, we expect retail deposits to be a more stable source of funding 
than wholesale markets. Thus banks with a broader deposit base should be more resilient in 
periods of crisis. 
iv. Income structure – It captures the two major income drivers of strategic importance to 
financial institutions. First, an aggressive lending strategy has traditionally been associated 
with a concentration of risk linked to looser credit standards (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 
2006; Tornell and Westermann, 2002). This is measured as a bank’s average quarterly loan 
growth minus the national average (exlend). Second, we capture the degree of income 
diversification and the extent to which a bank has moved towards more volatile non-
interest income by calculating their value as a percentage of total revenue (niinc).
17 
III.C  Ex-post measures of managerial abilities 
The run-up to the crisis coincided with an unprecedented increase in the stock market 
valuation of bank shares. Essentially, stock market value creation can be associated with 
managerial ability or the build-up of latent risk. In other words, the banks’ creation of high 
market-to-book values ex-ante (i.e. in the pre-crisis period) could have been due to genuine 
managerial ability (“true” alpha) or to the accumulation of hidden risks, generating high 
returns in the short-term but making institutions prone to catastrophic losses in the case of 
an exceptional event (high “fake” alpha  or “hidden” beta). Yet, as Rajan (2005) has 
indicated, in most cases it is difficult to measure in real time (i.e. ex-ante) managerial 
ability to generate “true” alpha.
18 This was particularly true in the period prior to the crisis 
as the profuse use of innovative financial instruments and banking expansion led to the 
emergence of new banking models, in which managers had stronger incentives to reap 
short-term returns (Acharya et al., 2010). According to Rajan (2005), “true” alpha can only 
                                                 
17 See Stirohl (2010, 2004). 
18 A vivid example here is provided by the Anglo Irish bank. This bank, which defaulted after receiving large amounts of government 
funding assistance, was previously ranked the world's top performing bank (for the period 2001 to 2005) by Mercer Oliver Wyman, a 
consultancy specialising in financial services strategy and risk management. For further details, see “Anglo Irish Bank is world's top 
performer” (www.independent.ie), 27 January 2006. 24
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be measured in the long-run and with the benefit of hindsight. Thus the realisation of risk 
during the financial crisis enables us, with hindsight, to distinguish between value creation 
due to “true” alpha and that merely due to the generation of tail risk.  
  We separate the “true” alpha from the “hidden” beta,  by combining ex-ante 
information on banks’ market-to-book values with data on their ex-post realization of risk. 
We hypothesize that those banks which created high levels of market-to-book value in the 
pre-crisis period (i.e. ex-ante) and achieved relatively low levels of risk during the crisis 
(i.e. ex-post) were more likely led by more able managers. On the other hand, the 
combination of a high ex-ante market-to-book value and high ex-post risk serves to identify 
those banks where value creation in the run up to the crisis was mostly driven by a build-up 
of latent risk. Figure 2 illustrates our reasoning. 
  We identify four types of banks in accordance with our main hypotheses. A bank 
will exhibit high “real” alpha if it showed a higher than average ex-ante market-to-book 
ratio as well as low levels of risk during the crisis – our “good management” hypothesis. 
On the other hand, the “fake” alpha hypothesis applies to those banks that were also 
creating higher than average market-to-book values ex-ante but which eventually 




  More precisely, we construct a dummy variable (high_riski
ex-post) which takes a 
value of one for those banks that experienced the highest level of risk during the crisis. 
These banks are identified by looking at the upper quartile of the cross-sectional 
distribution of the average one-year ahead expected default frequencies (edf)
19 for the crisis 
period. The edf value, expressed as a percentage, is calculated by combining the financial 
statements released by banks with stock market information and material from Moody’s 
                                                 
19 The “expected default frequency” is a forward-looking indicator of credit risk computed by Moody’s KMV based on financial markets 
data plus information from company balance sheets and Moody’s proprietary Bankruptcy Database. Here, we employ a different measure 
of bank risk that has not already been incorporated into our analysis as a proxy for bank risk. The use of the edf seems appropriate: 
although this may have underestimated risk in the pre-crisis period, it was a relatively good predictor of default during the recent credit 
crisis (see, for instance, Munves et al., 2009 and Dwyer and Qu, 2007). 25
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proprietary default database. The source of the expected default frequency series is 
Moody’s KMV. 
  We also construct a second dummy variable (low_riski
ex-post), identifying those 
banks belonging to the lower quartile of the same cross-sectional distribution. We then 
construct our measures of alpha (Alpha_edf) and beta (Beta_edf): 
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III.D  Additional controls   
In our empirical analysis, we also include a number of additional controls. The first 
accounts for bank profitability (roa), calculated as the quarterly return on assets (i.e. the 
ratio of net income to total assets). This control tests whether those banks attaining higher 
levels of actual (i.e. accounting) profits prior to the crisis were also those accumulating 
hidden risks that only materialized during the crisis.  
  Some of our specifications incorporate a group of macroeconomic controls, 
encompassing variables that have been found to be related to the likelihood of a banking 
crisis in developed countries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). These include changes in real 
housing prices (hp), based on the country series constructed by the Bank for International 
Settlements (see Borio and Drehmann, 2009), and also changes in the broad stock market 
indices for non-financial corporations (sm), as calculated by Datastream. Both of these 26
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asset price indices are demeaned from their long-term historical averages to capture 
abnormal changes in borrowers’ collateral values.  
  We account for the impact on bank risk of potential corporate governance problems 
arising from the bank ownership structure (Laeven and Levine, 2009, Erkens, Hung and 
Matos, 2009) with a Herfindahl index of ownership concentration, calculated as the sum of 
the squared values of the percentage of equity held by each individual shareholder. The 
corporate governance variable (cgov) is calculated by combining information on the 
ownership of each individual bank obtained from Thomson Reuters and Bankscope-Bureau 
van Dijk, two private data providers. According to earlier literature, the precise impact of a 
concentration in ownership on bank risk remains unclear.  
  Following Barth et al. (2004), the model includes a variable that accounts for the 
intensity of bank supervision and regulation in a given country during the pre-crisis period 
(regu).
20 In particular, we focus on regulations that inhibit a bank’s ability to engage in 
securities underwriting, brokering and dealing (see Barth et al., 2004). For the countries 
analyzed in this study, our regulation index takes a value between 5 and 12, with the latter 
figure indicating a more deregulated banking market.   
  We also construct a competition variable (comp) from the responses of bank credit 
officers to the European Central Bank (ECB) Bank Lending Survey for Euro area banks 
and to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey for United States banks. Data from these 
surveys is used to capture the effect of competition on the credit conditions for all 
borrowers in a net percentage index.
21 This index represents the difference between the 
number of banks that reported a tightening in credit conditions due to competition and the 
number that reported an easing. Negative index values would imply that increased 
competition led to lower credit standards. We would expect a negative sign for this 
variable, indicating that lower credit standards prompted by market competition resulted in 
more bank risk-taking.  
                                                 
20 The last survey by the World Bank includes data for 2007.  
21 We harmonised both surveys in a linear manner (see Maddaloni and Peydrò, 2011). 27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1394
November 2011
IV.  Results  
This section discusses the empirical findings of our analysis. We first present the results 
from probit and linear regression models applied to our three measures of risk. Thereafter, 
we look at the robustness of the results. Finally, we discuss the insights that can be derived 
from regression quantile estimates applied to systematic risk. To facilitate a comparison of 
our results, we use identical specifications throughout the models. 
IV.A  Probit and linear regressions 
Column I of Tables III-V provides the estimates of the baseline specification for the three 
different measures of risk. Columns II to V include additional firm-specific characteristics 
(such as low capital and profitability) and specifications including country-specific 
macroeconomic control variables. Columns VI to VIII add the variables accounting for 
firm managerial performance, economic growth, and asset prices. Table V, based on central 
bank liquidity demand, does not include all the controls because of the low number of 
observations for the dependent variable. 
  The results across the three tables are remarkably consistent, suggesting that they do 
not depend on a specific definition of bank risk:  
i. Capital structure – A higher level of Tier I capital ex-ante generally decreases the 
likelihood of bank distress during the crisis. This result holds for all three definitions of 
bank risk, albeit being weaker for systematic risk. It also confirms the earlier results of 
Beltratti and Stulz (2011) on bank performance during the crisis, and strengthens and 
extends them as regards bank risk (Mehran and Thakor, 2011). In addition, capital is even 
more important for undercapitalised banks, as indicated by the negative and highly 
statistically significant coefficients. This non-linear relationship between capital and risk is 
in line with Calem and Rob (1998), Perotti et al. (2011) and the proposals made by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2010 (BIS, 2010).  
ii. Asset structure – In terms of the asset structure, both bank size and the ratio of loans to 
total assets are positively related to our measures of bank risk, while securitization is 
negatively related. The results regarding size are consistent with the view that large banks 28
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were significantly riskier during the recent crisis. Large banks might have also probably 
been more often considered as “too big to fail”, and thus deemed more likely to be rescued 
(Huang, et al., 2011; Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Tarashev et al., 2009).   
  The apparently contradictory negative sign for size in Table V is explained by the 
fact that the dependent variable is in this case constructed as the ratio of central bank 
liquidity demand scaled by the size of the financial institution. Since size appears in the 
denominator of the dependent variable, higher size is mechanically associated with lower 
liquidity/size ratio. 
  The positive coefficient on loans to total assets disappears or becomes less 
significant when controlling for macroeconomic variables. Loans are likely correlated with 
broad macroeconomic variables such as house price developments, which blur their cross-
sectional differences. In addition, bank exposure to their loan book is heavily influenced by 
national factors.  
  The negative sign for securitization is robust to alternative specifications in Tables 
III-V, suggesting that banks, as originators, use traditional securitization to off-load riskier 
loans from their balance sheets rather than as an instrument for taking on more risk. This is 
line with findings by Knaup and Wagner (2009) on the determinants of tail risks for US 
banks. 
 
{Tables III to V} 
 
iii. Funding structure – Relying on a more solid funding structure reduces bank risk 
during times of crisis. The finding for deposits funding is robust across different 
specifications and also across alternative definitions of the dependent variable. In line with 
the previous discussion, customer deposits provide funding stability to banks and reduce 
the probability of a bank rescue. In contrast, the use of short-term marketable securities 
increases the probability of distress, which is in line with results from the pre-crisis period, 
based on risk measures derived from accounting information (Demirgüc-Kunt and 29
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Huizinga, 2010). In appears that those institutions more reliant on market funding are 
clearly more exposed to liquidity risk during the crisis, as it becomes problematic to roll 
over short-term debt to finance illiquid assets. 
iv. Income – On the income side, excessive loan growth enters with a strongly significant 
positive coefficient. An aggressive expansion in loan growth in the run-up to the crisis is 
generally associated with a relaxation of credit standards and a deterioration in the quality 
of the asset side of the balance sheet. The economic significance of this variable, plus its 
consistency, emphasises the similarity of the recent crisis with earlier episodes of financial 
turmoil (Tornell and Westermann, 2002). This raises the question of why remedial 
measures (such as anti-cyclical loan loss provisions) were not implemented at the 
supervisory level to smooth the credit cycle. It also informs the regulatory debate going 
forward (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Non-interest income, however, reduces the 
likelihood of distress during the crisis, vouching for the validity of income diversification 
to mitigate bank risk (Stiroh, 2010). 
v. Managerial performance – The financial crisis offers a unique opportunity to 
distinguish those banks that were relatively well-managed and created real value for their 
shareholders from those accumulating excessive risks on their balance sheets. The latter are 
essentially those institutions which attained high levels of stock market value in the pre-
crisis period with little understanding of (or concerns for) the potential for systematic risk. 
The increased complexity and greater international scope of the banking business in the 
years preceding the crisis made it more difficult for investors to separate financial 
institutions generating high alpha from those with just a high but “hidden” beta. The 
importance of disentangling “true” alpha from “hidden” beta is confirmed by the 
regression results for columns VI in Table IV. Indeed, our proxies for alpha and beta are 
significant and economically intuitive: banks characterized by high alpha experience 
significantly lower distress during the crisis, while those leveraging their books by 
increasing their beta exhibit, ex-post, significantly higher systematic risk. It is also telling 
that these measures increase the overall fit of the regression by more than 5 percentage 
points, suggesting that controlling for ex-ante bank business models still leaves a 
significant portion of risk unaccounted for. Our proxies for alpha and beta are constructed 30
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1394
November 2011
using ex-post data for the crisis and, therefore, are not useful for regulators who need to 
judge the performance of bank management in real time. Nonetheless, they do suggest that 
a prompt increase in the intensity of supervision for those banks experiencing a large 
expansion in their stock market valuation is warranted.  
IV.B  Robustness 
Table VI shows the results of our empirical specifications after controlling for an additional 
group of variables accounting for corporate governance at the individual bank level, bank 
competition and deregulation at the national level, since all these factors have been found 
to impact on bank risk-taking.  
  Our results suggest that while these control factors do indeed appear to have an 
effect on bank risk, most of our earlier results still stand. The impact of market funding on 
banking and on revenue diversification, however, becomes more blurred, and the role of 
managerial performance strengthens significantly. Nevertheless, the findings for all the 
other business characteristics remain strong in terms of their impact on bank risk.  
  The increase in banking competition experienced in the pre-crisis period is 
associated with higher bank risk-taking, suggesting that the decline in credit standards 
associated with more intensive bank competition (i.e. negative values) has an impact on 
bank risk-taking (see Hellman et al., 2000). A more concentrated ownership structure (i.e. a 
higher Herfindahl index) is found to be related to lower levels of risk. It would appear that 
those banks whose ownership is more diversified have a stronger incentive to increase risk 
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IV.C  Regression quantiles: a more nuanced consideration of the determinants of 
bank distress during a crisis 
In the previous section we described how the risk encountered by the average bank during 
the crisis is related to variables linked to the underlying business model. From a financial 
stability perspective, it would be particularly interesting to discover whether bank business 
models themselves have a differentiated impact in terms of the levels of risk experienced. 
More precisely, we would like to know whether capital, asset, funding or income structures 
are of equal importance in determining the level of distress of banks with a high and low 
degree of risk.  
 
  By construction, probit and linear regression models give only a measure of the 
central tendency of the relationship between dependent and independent variables. This 
assumes that covariates affect only the location of the conditional distribution of y. 
Heteroskedasticity models can be used to estimate the dependence of y on x, but the impact 
on other aspects of the shape of the conditional distribution are assumed to be unchanged. 
Still, covariates can affect the conditional distribution in other ways, for instance, by 
stretching one tail but not the other. To give a concrete example, in the previous section we 
found that size is generally associated with an increase in bank distress during the crisis. 
But does this result necessarily hold for all banks (as the ordinary least squares, OLS, 
estimates would suggest) or does size disproportionately increase risk for riskier banks 
relative to the less risky ones? We can obtain a more complete picture of the distributional 
dependence between the bank business model and bank risk by estimating quantile 
regressions. 
  Regression quantiles were first introduced to applied economics by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978) and have been widely used ever since (for an introductory survey, see 
Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Our regression quantile estimates are obtained by minimizing 
the following objective function: 32
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 Here  N is the number of observations,() ( I( 0)),  I is the indicator 
function whereby I equals one if the expression in parenthesis is true and zero if otherwise, 
and    (0,1) is the probability associated with the quantile. To facilitate a comparison 
with the results discussed in the previous sub-section, we use the same empirical 
specification of the earlier models, that is: 
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  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the usefulness of the quantile regression approach. Figure 
3 presents the scatter plot of size and the ex-post measure of risk for all the banks in our 
sample. Superimposed on this chart are the regression line (the dark line), as well as the 
25% and 75% quantile regression lines (the upper and lower continuous lines). The scatter 
plot clearly reveals that the dispersion of risk increases considerably with the size of the 
bank and that size has a different impact on the upper and lower quantiles (compared with 




  Figure 4 provides a summary illustration of the impact of size on bank risk for each 
percentile. The solid line represents the 99 estimates of the quantile regression coefficient 33
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(,3) for , ranging from 0.01 to 0.99, together with the 95% confidence intervals. 
Superimposed on the diagram is a dashed line representing the OLS estimate, again 
together with a 95% confidence interval. Note that, for up to around the 15% quantile, the 
quantile regression estimate lies outside the mean regression confidence interval, indicating 
that the mean is not a sufficient statistic to summarize the relationship between the 
distribution of the bank risk and size. The chart confirms the key finding discussed in the 
previous sub-section, namely that size is indeed associated with higher levels of risk during 
the crisis. However, the Figure also shows that size has a lower impact on the left side of 
the conditional distribution of bank risk (i.e. the side where the relatively less risky banks 
are to be found) than on the right side (where the relatively riskier banks are located). 
 
{Figures 3 and 4} 
  The estimates of the full model for the 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90% quantiles are 
presented in Table VII. Again, we distinguish between four types of business models, as 
identified by: (i) capital, (ii) asset, (iii) funding, and (iv) income structures. The last column 
in the table reports the results of the equality test that the slope coefficients of the 
regression quantiles are all the same. Unsurprisingly, and quite reassuringly, the signs of 
the regression quantile coefficients are coherent with the OLS results. However, for 
variables related to the asset and funding structure, we notice that the test results reported 
in the last column of the table reject the null hypothesis that all regression quantile 
coefficients are equal.
22  
  In the asset structure, the ratio of loans to total assets is not significant in the lower 
part of the conditional distribution of bank distress, but statistically significant for the upper 
quantiles, i.e. for the group of (conditionally) most distressed banks. This suggests that 
loans to total assets contribute to an increase in distress for the riskiest institutions (in the 
                                                 
22 The test for the size variable does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of size is equal across all the quantile specifications. 
Unlike in the example shown in Figure 3 – where size enters the quantile regression by itself and the estimated coefficient is different in 
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higher quantiles), but have no effect on less risky ones. Opposite results hold for 
securitization: greater amounts of securitization decrease the level of distress of the riskiest 
banks, but are irrelevant for less risky ones. 
    The bank funding structure affects bank risk across the entire conditional 
distribution. However, the results show that reliance on short-term funding is relatively 
more significant for the distress experienced by the riskiest banks than that of less risky 
ones. Similarly, a solid deposit base is disproportionately more significant for lowering the 
distress of banks in the upper part of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable 
than for those in the lower part. Finally, excessive loan growth increases the risk of distress 
during the crisis disproportionately for the riskiest banks. 
  
{Table VII} 
V.  Conclusion 
One of the main reasons for the existence of banks is that they are better at evaluating and 
managing risks than other institutions. In the recent financial crisis, however, banks 
suffered losses on a scale not witnessed since the Great Depression. It is precisely this 
special “risk evaluator” role that makes the banking industry particularly opaque.  
The opacity of the sector has probably increased in recent years due to the structural 
changes brought about by deregulation and financial innovation; changes that have made 
the industry significantly more complex, larger, more global and dependent on financial 
markets. We take advantage of the opportunity provided by the crisis to analyze whether 
the differences in bank business models can be related to the bank risk that materialized 
during the period of crisis. 
Using several measures of ex-post bank risk, we show that the distress experienced 
during the financial crisis was driven ex-ante by bank size, undercapitalization, and the 
degree of credit expansion in the years preceding it. The bank funding structure also seems 
to be of significance, with those banks relying on a large deposit base suffering less than 
those more dependent on market funding. In addition, by implementing quantile regression 35
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techniques, we show that the impact of business model characteristics is non-linear, as it 
changes according to the level of bank risk encountered: for the group of “riskier” 
institutions, bank distress is relatively more sensitive to loan expansion and customer 
deposits. We also find that stock market value creation in the run-up to the crisis often 
involved the accumulation of systematic risks, which cannot entirely be accounted for by 
ex-ante business models. 
  Our results support the prudential regulatory initiatives via Basel III, aimed at 
raising the core capital levels of institutions, in particular of undercapitalized ones. They 
also concur with efforts directed at reducing the cyclicality of credit provided by banks and 
increasing the capital charges for those institutions relying more strongly on short-term 
market funding. Given its quantitative importance, a careful assessment of the 
implementation of the anti-cyclical capital buffers proposed by Basel III is warranted. For 
instance, we show that agressive loan growth seems to be a very good leading indicator of 
bank risk, so that capital charges linked to this variable might be considered.  
  Although Basel III has not incorporated this issue explicitly, our findings also 
suggest that regulators would need to intensify supervisory interference significantly. 
Namely, the importance of business models, and divergence in the realization of risk across 
institutions during the crisis, would imply that a better supervisory understanding of bank 
incentives in real time (i.e. before they materialize) is warranted. In particular, our results 
call for supervisors to enhance their knowledge of the impact of different business models 
on bank risk. Finally, our findings recommend a better understanding of the risk-taking 
incentives, in particular by those banks experiencing rapid increases in their stock market 
valuations. 36
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Data Sources and Variables Definitions 
This table presents the names of all the variables employed in our empirical analysis (preliminary and final). It also includes the data sources as well as a 
brief description of how the variables have been constructed. More detailed information, plus all publicly available data, is available upon request.   
Variables Symbol Source Description
Panel A: Bank risk
Financial support resc  European Commission, central banks, Bank 
for International Settlements, governmental 
institutions and Bloomberg. 
Binary variable – with a value of 1 if public financial support was received during the crisis period
(2007Q4 to 2009Q4) and 0, if otherwise
Systematic risk risk Authors' calculation and Datastream Average of the quarterly non-overlapping beta in a capital asset pricing model calculated for each
bank using daily stock market data during the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4)
Expected default frequency edf Moody's KMV Probability of a bank defaulting within a year during the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4)
calculated by Moodys KMV 
Central bank liquidity bid European Central Bank Ratio of total liquidity received from the Eurosystem to total assets * 100 during the crisis-period
(2007Q4 to 2009Q4)
Panel B: Other variables
Capital structure
Tier I capital eta  Bloomberg Tier I capital to total assets * 100 during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3) 
Undercapitalised  etareg Authors' calculation Low capital dummy variable (1 indicates a bank with a Tier I ratio below 6%) for the pre-crisis
period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3) 
Asset structure and securitization
Size size  Bloomberg Logarithm of total assets (USD millions) during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Loans to total assets  loanta  Bloomberg Total loans to total assets * 100 during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Securitization abs DCM Analytics Dealogic Ratio of total securitization to total assets * 100 during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Funding structure
Short-term market funding  mktassets  Bloomberg Short-term marketable securities (i.e. less than 2 years) to total assets * 100 during the pre-crisis
period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Deposit funding dep  Bloomberg Customer deposits to total assets * 100 during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Loan growth and income
Excessive loan growth exlend Authors' calculation Individual bank lending growth minus the average loan growth of all banks over a specific quarter
during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Non-interest income  niinc  Bloomberg Non-interest income to total revenues * 100 during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
Managerial performance
Market-to-book T
*  Bloomberg Market-to-book value of equity demeaned during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3) 
High_risk ex post high_risk
ex -post Authors' calculation Dummy variable - with a value of 1 if a bank is positioned at the upper quartile (i.e. with the riskier
banks) of the bank average expected default frequencies during the crisis period (2007Q4 to
2009Q4)
Low_risk ex post low_risk
ex -post Authors' calculation Dummy variable – with a value of 1 if a bank is positioned in the lower quartile (i.e. with the
relatively safe banks) of the cross-sectional distribution of bank average expected default
frequencies during the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4)
Alpha_edf alpha_edf Authors' calculation See Section 4. Calculated as the average market-to-book value during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 
to 2007Q3) of those banks among the group of relatively safe institutions (in the lowest quartile) in
the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4) based on their 1-year ahead expected default frequencies at
this time
Beta_edf beta_edf Authors' calculation See Section 4. Calculated as the average market-to-book value during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 
to 2007Q3) of those banks among the group of riskier institutions (in the highest quartile) in the
crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4) based on their 1-year ahead expected default frequencies at this
time
Control variables
Profitability roa Bloomberg Ratio of net income to total assets * 100 during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
GDP growth gdp Bank for International Settlements Quarterly changes in real GDP during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
House prices  hp Bank for International Settlements Quarterly changes in real housing prices during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)
demeaned from their long-term historical averages (prior 20 years)
Stock market sm Datastream Quarterly changes on the broadbroad stock market indices for non-financial corporations calculated
by Datastream during the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3) de-meaned from their long-term
historical averages (prior 20 years)
Corporate governance  cgov Authors' calculation - Thomson Reuters Summing of the squared percentage of shares controlled by each shareholder
Regulation regu World Bank Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). Based on surveys (for 2000, 2003 and 2008) sent to national bank
regulatory and supervisory authorities - we focus on regulations that inhibit a bank's ability to
engage in securities underwriting, brokering and all aspects of the mutual fund industry, and
calculate average values for all these categories 
Competition  comp Federal Reserve Board, Eurosystem and  
Sveriges Riksbank
Obtained from the answers to bank lending surveys submitted by credit officers who report on
whether credit standards have been affected by a perceived increase in competition and, thus,
loosened (i.e. a negative impact). The results of these surveys provide national averages for each
quarter. Our analysis is based on average changes for the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3)42
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Summary Statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our paper (see Section III and Table I for further details). Unless stated otherwise, 
descriptive statistics are derived from the average values calculated on the basis of quarterly data for the pre-crisis or the crisis period. Variables 
accounting for bank risk are calculated from the average values for each bank during the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4) except for the variable 
accounting for central bank liquidity. This is constructed as the average of just the period of full allotment of liquidity provision by the European 
Central Bank (from 2008Q4 to 2009Q4) to avoid any distortions arising from changes in the operational framework. The variables accounting for 
capital structure, asset structure and securitization, funding structure, loan growth and income, profitability and corporate governance are calculated 
from the averages of quarterly data for individual banks for the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q3). GDP growth, house prices, the stock market 
and competition are calculated from the country averages for quarterly data for the pre-crisis period already mentioned. The regulation variable is 
calculated from the average values for each country derived from the latest available surveys (i.e. for 2000, 2003 and 2008). The Alpha_edf and 
Beta_edf variables related to managerial performance are calculated from the averages for individual banks for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
Variables N Average Median
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Financial support 1,138 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0
Systematic risk 510 0.7 0.5 0.6 -0.3 2.3
Expected default frequency 614 1.0 0.3 2.3 0.0 27.8
Central bank liquidity 83 3.4 1.2 6.3 0.0 46.9
Capital structures
Tier I capital 1,088 10.1 9.0 5.4 1.4 49.6
Undercapitalised  1,088 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 6.0
Asset structure and securitization
Size 1,115 6.9 6.4 2.2 -1.8 14.0
Loans to total assets  1,081 64.3 68.1 17.5 0.0 97.6
Securitization 1,138 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 19.7
Funding structure
Short-term market funding  1,112 19.4 16.7 14.1 1.0 90.0
Deposit funding 1,076 8.9 5.0 11.0 0.0 70.0
Loan growth and Income
Excessive loan growth 886 6.2 5.8 2.3 -2.1 13.3
Non-interest income  1,057 17.9 15.2 12.1 0.2 78.7
Managerial performance
Market-to-book  1,070 1.2 1.1 0.3 0.1 4.0
High_risk ex post 614 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0
Low_risk ex post 614 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0
Alpha_edf 595 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 2.1
Beta_edf 595 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 1.2
Control variables
Profitability 1,106 1.0 0.9 1.0 -6.2 10.0
GDP growth 1,138 1.3 1.3 0.2 0.6 2.1
House prices  1,138 1.2 1.3 0.6 -1.6 2.4
Stock market  1,138 1.5 1.4 0.6 -0.2 5.6
Regulation 1,138 10.5 11.2 1.6 5.0 11.2
Competition 1,138 -59.3 -70.9 23.4 -70.9 1.1
Corporate Governance 791 6.8 1.7 13.4 0.0 100.0
Panel A: Bank risk
Panel B: Other variables 
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Effects of bank business models on bank risk: 
probit estimates for the probability of receiving public financial support 
This table presents the effects of bank business models and other variables on bank risk using our main specification (see Section III for further details and 
Table I for variable definitions). It provides the probit estimates for the probability of a bank receiving financial support from the government (resc). This 
variable is constructed on the basis of information collected on the public rescue of banks via capital injections, the issuance of guaranteed bonds or other 
government-sponsored programmes. The variables accounting for bank risk (in this case, resc) are calculated for the crisis period (2007Q3 to 2009Q4). 
Variables accounting for bank capital structure, asset structure and securitization, funding structure, loan growth and income, and profitability are calculated 
from the averages of quarterly data for individual banks for the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q4). GDP growth, house prices, the stock market and 
competition are calculated from the country averages of quarterly data for the pre-crisis period already mentioned. The Alpha_edf and Beta_edf variables 
accounting for managerial performance are calculated from the averages for individual banks for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
(I)      (II)   (III)   (IV)   (V)   (VI) (VII)  (VIII) 
Tier I capital -0.0448 *** -0.0699 *** -0.0743 *** -0.0781 *** -0.0891 *** -0.0896 *** -0.0925 *** -0.1021 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.030) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.017)
Undercapitalized -0.1401 *** -0.1329 *** -0.1354 *** -0.0691 *** -0.1576 *** -0.1699 *** -0.1006 ***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.031) (0.023) (0.008) (0.016) (0.039)
Size 0.1144 *** 0.1382 *** 0.1337 *** 0.1309 ** 0.1677 *** 0.0942 *** 0.0934 *** 0.1306 ***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.061) (0.003) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011)
Loans to total assets  0.0182 *** 0.0158 *** 0.0149 *** 0.0145 ** 0.0115 *** 0.0073 0.0064 ** 0.0043
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011)
Securitization -0.0408 *** -0.0348 *** -0.0352 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0794 *** -0.3904 *** -0.4780 *** -0.3784 ***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.022) (0.079) (0.079) (0.005)
Short-term market funding  0.0267 *** 0.0241 *** 0.0236 *** 0.0227 *** 0.0143 *** 0.0107 ** 0.0103 *** 0.0046
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Deposit funding -0.0379 *** -0.0347 *** -0.0342 *** -0.0327 *** -0.0251 *** -0.0381 *** -0.0331 *** -0.0237 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
Excessive loan growth 0.1330 *** 0.1302 *** 0.1281 *** 0.1324 ** 0.1323 *** 0.1581 *** 0.1658 *** 0.1500 **
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.055) (0.004) (0.030) (0.029) (0.063)
Non-interest income  -0.0108 *** -0.0116 *** -0.0124 *** -0.0093 ** -0.0119 *** -0.0071 *** -0.0057 *** -0.0064 *
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Alpha_edf -0.3630 -0.5593 -0.3874
(0.603) (0.814) (0.629)
Beta_edf 1.1741 *** 0.9601 *** 0.1307
(0.066) (0.012) (0.250)
Profitability 0.0957 * 0.0433 -0.0273 0.1541 * 0.0780 0.0209
(0.058) (0.214) (0.048) (0.080) (0.064) (0.080)
GDP growth 0.8208 *** 1.0193 ** 0.8623 *** 1.1356 ***
(0.221) (0.516) (0.033) (0.206)
House prices  0.5140 * 0.3965 ***
(0.267) (0.081)
Stock market -0.3927 *** -0.3951 ***
(0.024) (0.016)
Intercept -3.1363 *** -2.8028 *** -2.7321 *** -3.7687 *** -3.8629 *** -1.7960 *** -2.8625 *** -3.0009 **
(0.307) (0.391) (0.446) (0.266) (0.489) (0.616) (0.518) (1.376)
No. of observations 852 852 852 863 838 547 546 547
Pseudo R2 0.0995 0.1113 0.1121 0.1195 0.1394 0.1283 0.138 0.1621
Percent true positives/negatives 51.72/76.15 54.84/76.53 59.02/76.81 56.14/76.43 57.97/77.08 58.33/75.05 60.00/75.26 54.41/75.05
Percent correctly classified 74.51 75.0 75.55 75.09 75.55 73.22 73.59 72.5
Hosmer–Lemeshow test 7.05 4.44 1.44 6.21 7.46 12.39 5.74 9.69










































































































































The effects of bank business models on bank risk: 
OLS estimates for systematic risk 
This table presents the effects of bank business models and other variables on bank risk using our main specification (see Section III for further details 
and Table I for variable definitions). It provides the OLS estimates for bank distress, measured as individual bank systematic risk during the crisis 
period (risk). This variable is calculated as the average of the non-overlapping quarterly beta in a capital asset pricing model calculated for each bank 
quarterly using daily stock market data for the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4). The variables accounting for bank capital structure, asset structure 
and securitization, funding structure, loan growth and income, and profitability are calculated from the averages of quarterly data for individual banks 
for the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q4). GDP growth, house prices, the stock market and competition are calculated from the country averages of 
quarterly data for the pre-crisis period already mentioned. The Alpha_edf and Beta_edf variables accounting for managerial performance are calculated 
from the averages for individual banks for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
(I)      (II)   (III)   (IV)   (V)   (VI)   (VII)   (VIII)  
Tier I capital 0.0040 -0.0097 -0.0233 *** -0.0207 *** -0.0160 ** -0.0156 *** -0.0220 ** -0.0209 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
Undercapitalized -0.0811 *** -0.0733 *** -0.0740 *** -0.0487 *** -0.0815 *** -0.0875 *** -0.0568 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020)
Size 0.1039 *** 0.1090 *** 0.1114 *** 0.1041 *** 0.1327 *** 0.1784 *** 0.1605 *** 0.1714 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.020) (0.032) (0.035)
Loans to total assets  0.0083 *** 0.0061 *** 0.0058 ** 0.0053 ** 0.0057 ** 0.0033 *** 0.0001 -0.0009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Securitization -0.2073 *** -0.2076 *** -0.1885 *** -0.2055 *** -0.1359 ** -0.1653 *** -0.1687 *** -0.0984 *
(0.057) (0.054) (0.055) (0.063) (0.061) (0.023) (0.059) (0.060)
Short-term market funding  0.0119 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0046 0.0023
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Deposit funding -0.0217 *** -0.0201 *** -0.0191 *** -0.0179 *** -0.0149 *** -0.0195 *** -0.0189 *** -0.0153 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Excessive loan growth 0.1560 *** 0.1597 *** 0.1554 *** 0.1597 *** 0.1405 *** 0.1052 *** 0.1170 *** 0.1091 ***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.009) (0.029) (0.028)
Non-interest income  -0.0050 *** -0.0043 ** -0.0064 *** -0.0053 ** -0.0043 * -0.0059 *** -0.0051 ** -0.0042
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Alpha_edf -1.7663 *** -2.2279 *** -2.2953 ***
(0.026) (0.695) (0.692)
Beta_edf 0.7409 *** 0.5753 0.5553
(0.007) (0.414) (0.364)
Profitability 0.1824 *** 0.1705 *** 0.0978 ** 0.1607 *** 0.2268 *** 0.1993 ***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.003) (0.058) (0.061)
GDP growth 0.2198 ** 0.2770 *** 0.1724 0.2487 **
(0.110) (0.104) (0.109) (0.104)
House price  0.1554 *** 0.1456 ***
(0.040) (0.043)
Stock market -0.1101 *** -0.1236 ***
(0.036) (0.042)
Intercept -1.6053 *** -1.3420 *** -1.3931 *** -1.6561 *** -1.8555 *** -1.4259 *** -1.3668 *** -1.4105 ***
(0.252) (0.257) (0.276) (0.300) (0.331) (0.118) (0.354) (0.390)
No. of observations 483 483 483 483 486 364 358 358












































































































































The effects of bank business models on bank risk: 
OLS estimates for central bank liquidity 
This table presents the effects of bank business models and other variables on bank risk using our main specification (see Section III for further details 
and Table I for variable definitions). It provides the OLS estimates for bank distress measured as the total liquidity received by each institution from 
the central bank (bid). This variable is calculated as the ratio of the total liquidity received from the Eurosystem during the crisis-period (2007Q4 to 
2009Q4) to total assets * 100. The variables accounting for bank capital structure, asset structure and securitization, funding structure, loan growth 
and income, and profitability are calculated from the averages of quarterly data for individual banks for the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q4). 
GDP growth, is calculated from the country averages of quarterly data for the pre-crisis period already mentioned. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
(I)      (II)   (III)   (IV)   (V)   (VI)  
Tier I capital -0.1771 *** -0.1814 *** -0.2978 *** -0.3308 *** -0.2718 ** -0.2423 ***
(0.062) (0.053) (0.026) (0.043) (0.119) (0.017)
Undercapitalized -0.0097 -0.0131 -0.1115 *** 0.0122 -0.2273 ***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.005) (0.179) (0.038)
Size -0.2985 *** -0.2979 *** -0.5000 *** -0.5844 *** 0.0778 -1.6089 ***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.042) (0.042) (1.070) (0.040)
Loans to total assets  0.0779 *** 0.0781 *** 0.0559 *** 0.0695 *** 0.0642 -0.0395 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.046) (0.011)
Securitisation -0.6003 *** -0.6012 *** -0.4397 *** -0.9080 *** -0.6080 -0.4731 *
(0.140) (0.143) (0.085) (0.096) (0.525) (0.255)
Short-term market funding  0.1485 *** 0.1483 *** 0.1366 *** 0.1403 *** 0.0937 ** 0.0186 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.044) (0.004)
Deposit funding -0.0759 *** -0.0759 *** -0.0621 *** -0.0628 *** -0.0198 -0.0355 **
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Excessive loan growth 0.4462 *** 0.4453 *** 0.6182 *** 0.7737 *** -0.2190 1.4540 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.022) (0.940) (0.032)
Non-interest income  -0.2356 *** -0.2350 *** -0.2698 *** -0.2574 *** -0.2000 *** -0.2594 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.043) (0.014)
Alpha_edf 1.9940 -27.6183 ***
(7.431) (4.738)
Beta_edf 7.6373 *** 1.6826 **
(2.831) (0.779)
Return on assets  2.0872 *** 0.7259 3.4926 ***
(0.245) (0.732) (0.158)
GDP growth 1.6483 ***
(0.487)
Intercept 2.9410 *** 2.9702 *** 4.7210 *** 2.5345 *** 6.4676 15.1652 ***
(0.201) (0.143) (0.109) (0.906) (5.440) (0.472)
No. of observations 72 72 72 72 66 66
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The effects of bank business models on bank risk: robustness tests 
This table presents the effects of bank business models and other variables on bank risk using our main specification (see Section III for further details and 
Table I for variable definitions). Columns I to III provide the probit estimates for the probability of a bank receiving financial support from the government 
(resc). This variable is constructed on the basis of information collected on the public rescue of banks via capital injections, the issuance of guaranteed bonds 
or other government-sponsored programmes during the crisis period (2007Q3 to 2009Q4). Columns IV to VIII present the OLS estimates for bank distress, 
measured as individual bank systematic risk during the period of crisis (risk). This variable is calculated as the average of the non-overlapping quarterly beta 
in a capital asset pricing model calculated for each bank quarterly using daily stock market data for the crisis period specified. The variables accounting for 
bank capital structure, asset structure and securitization, funding structure, loan growth and income, profitability and also corporate governance are 
calculated from the averages of quarterly data for individual banks for the pre-crisis period (2003Q4 to 2007Q4). GDP growth, house prices, the stock 
market, competition and regulation are calculated from the country averages of quarterly data for the pre-crisis period already mentioned. The Alpha_edf and 
Beta_edf variables accounting for managerial performance are calculated from the averages for individual banks for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
(I)   (II)  (III)  (IV) (V) (VI)
Tier I capital -0.1049 *** -0.1024 *** -0.1000 *** -0.0141 *** -0.0015 -0.0023
(0.007) (0.029) (0.031) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
Undercapitalized -0.2108 *** -0.0321 -0.0154 -0.0552 *** -0.0419 ** -0.0278 *
(0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016)
Size 0.0643 0.2203 ** 0.1974 *** 0.0959 *** 0.1272 *** 0.1474 ***
(0.091) (0.103) (0.077) (0.013) (0.049) (0.048)
Loan to total assets  0.0075 *** 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0047 *** -0.0013 -0.0004
(0.001) (0.015) (0.014) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Securitisation -0.4666 *** -0.3673 *** -0.3532 *** -0.1884 *** -0.0602 -0.0010
(0.086) (0.009) (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) (0.039)
Short-term market funding  0.0077 *** -0.0041 * -0.0034 *** 0.0009 ** 0.0016 0.0013
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Deposit funding -0.0350 *** -0.0216 *** -0.0167 *** -0.0163 *** -0.0114 *** -0.0107 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Excessive loan growth 0.2407 *** 0.0957 *** 0.1107 *** 0.1620 *** 0.1209 *** 0.1106 ***
(0.071) (0.007) (0.017) (0.002) (0.041) (0.039)
Non-interest income  -0.0044 *** -0.0058 *** -0.0081 *** -0.0039 *** 0.0035 0.0040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Alpha_edf -1.5150 *** -0.2606 1.0869 -2.0789 *** -2.3482 *** -2.2903 ***
(0.517) (0.373) (1.358) (0.076) (0.657) (0.634)
Beta_edf 1.1697 ** 0.1205 0.4466 *** 2.3684 *** 0.8383 * 0.7647 *
(0.577) (0.533) (0.173) (0.146) (0.467) (0.433)
Return on assets  0.0087 0.0541 -0.0115 0.2832 *** 0.0740 0.0324
(0.012) (0.169) (0.124) (0.011) (0.064) (0.064)
GDP growth 0.5974 ** 0.3928 *** 0.1829 * 0.1625
(0.257) (0.119) (0.103) (0.106)
House price  0.5598 *** 0.1704 ***
(0.121) (0.040)
Stock market 0.0489 -0.0314
(0.084) (0.046)
Governance -0.0221 *** -0.0022 ***
(0.003) (0.000)
Regulation -0.1669 *** -0.2214 *** 0.0531 ** 0.0234
(0.032) (0.035) (0.023) (0.023)
Competition -0.0367 *** -0.0344 ** -0.0034 *** -0.0046 ***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002)
Intercept -1.6029 *** -2.9540 -2.5741 -0.7255 *** -2.0381 *** -2.0409 ***
(0.159) (2.375) (2.312) (0.046) (0.414) (0.404)
No. of observations 438 537 531   291 365 365
Pseudo R
2 0.1621 0.1815 0.1802 0.5823 0.5519 0.5697
Percent true positives/negatives 65.35/75.37 58.21/75.52 61.04/76.69
Percent correctly classified 73.06 73.41 74.5
Hosmer–Lemeshow test 8 8.78 8.7
Hosmer–Lemeshow test p-value 0.4338 0.3608 0.3683



















































































































































The distributional effects of bank business models on bank risk: 
quantile estimates for systematic risk  
This table presents the distributional dependence between the bank business model and other variables relating to bank risk using our simplified 
specification (see Section IV.C for a more detailed explanation of our application of regression quantiles and Table I for variable definitions). It 
provides the quantile regression estimates for bank distress, measured as individual bank systematic risk during the crisis period (risk). This variable is 
calculated as the average of the non-overlapping quarterly beta in a capital asset pricing model calculated for each bank quarterly using daily stock 
market data for the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4). The variables accounting for bank capital structure, asset structure and securitization, funding 
structure, loan growth and income, and profitability are calculated from the averages of quarterly data for individual banks for the pre-crisis period 
(2003Q4 to 2007Q4). GDP growth, house prices, the stock market, and competition are calculated from the country averages of quarterly data for the 
pre-crisis period already mentioned. The Alpha_edf and Beta_edf variables accounting for managerial performance are calculated from the averages 
for individual banks for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The 
equality test applied is the F-test where the null hypothesis is that the estimated slope coefficients for each variable are not statistically different across 
all the different quantile estimates. The p-value for this test is given below the equality test value. 
Q 1 0Q 2 5Q 5 0Q 7 5Q 9 0 Equality
Test
1
Tier I capital 0.0075 -0.0017 -0.0056 -0.0138 * -0.0055 1.1300
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) 0.340
Undercapitalized -0.0459 *** -0.0438 *** -0.0491 ** -0.0571 *** -0.0467 ** 0.5300
(0.015) (0.011) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024) 0.711
Size 0.1516 *** 0.1619 *** 0.1158 ** 0.1086 ** 0.0653 0.3200
(0.031) (0.021) (0.050) (0.042) (0.064) 0.867
Loans to total assets  0.0005 0.0006 0.0046 0.0089 *** 0.0097 * 5.8200
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 0.016
Securitisation 0.0478 0.0331 -0.0729 -0.1192 ** -0.1742 *** 6.0100
(0.029) (0.031) (0.081) (0.053) (0.041) 0.015
Short-term market funding  0.0029 0.0058 *** 0.0103 ** 0.0138 *** 0.0111 ** 4.6600
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 0.031
Deposit funding -0.0158 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0191 *** -0.0289 *** -0.0335 *** 3.9500
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 0.004
Excessive loan growth 0.0371 * 0.0621 *** 0.1385 *** 0.1284 *** 0.2054 *** 6.5400
(0.022) (0.017) (0.044) (0.038) (0.059) 0.011
Non-interest income  0.0012 -0.0052 *** -0.0079 ** -0.0063 ** -0.0002 2.3700
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 0.125
Return on assets  0.1038 ** 0.2390 *** 0.2597 *** 0.0869 * 0.1012 ** 2.6600
(0.041) (0.027) (0.057) (0.049) (0.050) 0.104
Intercept -1.3269 *** -1.3913 *** -1.4986 *** -0.9853 *** -1.1544 **
(0.296) (0.192) (0.416) (0.357) (0.537)



















































































































Box plot distribution of the stock market returns of individual banks 
The diagram below shows the cross-sectional distribution of stock market returns for the listed European and US banks included in our sample. It is based on 
data for monthly stock market prices obtained from Datastream for the period 2003Q4 to 2009Q4. The 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90% quantiles of the 
distribution of average stock market returns for the pre-crisis (2003Q4 to 2007Q3) and crisis (2007Q4 to 2009Q4) periods are presented. This “box plot” 
consists of a “box” that moves from the first to the third quartile (Q1 to Q3). Within the box itself, the thick horizontal line represents the median. The area 






















Source: Constructed from data obtained from Datastream.   
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Figure 2  
Main hypotheses relating to alpha creation (fake versus real alpha)   
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the variables accounting for management performance – alpha_edf and beta_edf (see Section III.C for further 
details and Table I for variable definitions). Above the Y axis are those banks whose average one-year ahead expected default frequency (edf) belongs to the 
upper quartile of the cross-sectional distribution of this variable which covers all banks in the crisis period (i.e. 2007Q4 to 2009Q4), while those with an average 
one-year ahead edf belonging to the lower quartile of the cross-sectional distribution are to be found below this axis. The X axis separates those banks with an 
above average market-to-book value in the pre-crisis period (i.e. 2003Q4 to 2007Q3) from those with one that is below average. The former are to be found on 
the right-hand side of the X axis and the latter on the left-hand-side.   
 

























The distributional effects of bank size on bank risk: 
quantile estimates of the size coefficient related to systematic risk 
The black line in Figure 3 plots the projected estimates of the OLS coefficient of bank size on distress. Bank distress is measured as the individual bank 
systematic risk during the crisis period (risk). This variable is calculated as the average of the non-overlapping quarterly beta in a capital asset pricing 
model calculated for each bank quarterly using daily stock market data for the crisis period (2007Q4 to 2009Q4). It also presents the 25% and 75% 
projected estimates of the quantile coefficients for the distributional dependence of bank size on bank distress. See Table VII for the detailed quantile 
regression results; Table I for variable definitions and Section IV.C for a more detailed explanation of our quantile regression estimation.  
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Figure 4 
The distributional effects of bank size on bank risk: 
quantile estimates of the size coefficient related to systematic risk 
The dotted line in Figure 4 plots the OLS coefficient of bank size on distress – including the 95% confidence intervals. In addition, it presents the 
different quantile regression estimates – including the 95% confidence intervals – for the coefficients associated with the impact of the size variable on 
bank distress, which is measured as individual bank systematic risk during the crisis period (risk). This variable is calculated as the average of the non-
overlapping quarterly beta in a capital asset pricing model calculated for each bank quarterly using daily stock market data for the crisis period (2007Q4 
to 2009Q4). See Table VII for the detailed quantile regression results; Table I for variable definitions and Section IV.C for a more detailed explanation 
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Source: Constructed from data obtained from Datastream.   
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